SHELL COMPANIES for money laundering, tax evasion, hiding kickbacks, layering PART 19 -- CAPT AJIT VADAKAYIL

THIS POST IS CONTINUED FROM PART 20, BELOW--

http://ajitvadakayil.blogspot.in/2017/03/shell-companies-for-money-laundering_17.html

Mexican money brokers move cash overtly as a routine part of their business.  Much of the money smuggled into Mexico and then brought back into the United States for deposit is believed to be reported, as required, to U.S. Customs and Border Protection on CMIR forms (Currency and Monetary Instrument Report)  upon entry into the United States.

However, discrepancies between reporting on CMIRs and subsequent CTR filings by U.S. banks, whenthe cash is deposited, indicate that cash brought from Mexico is being comingled with additional cash already in the United States before being deposited. 

One method money launderers use to create theimpression that large currency deposits consist of legitimate funds is to show financial institution employees a completed CMIR form.   But the CMIR, whether or not legitimate, is irrelevant to whether atransaction should be considered suspicious. 

The Panama Papers are shining light on the hidden world of money laundering, providing important details on how overseas shell corporations are used to make dirty money look clean.

The money laundering process is staggeringly complex, the scope is large and operations are limited only by the launderer'simagination.

The release of the Panama Papers shines a light on dirty money overseas.

 Mossack Fonseca, the Panamanian law firm that is the source of the Panama Papers, is just one firm in a single country. It has spent the past 40 years creating shell companies

 In the placement stage, "dirty" money is deposited into a legitimate financial institution such as a bank or a brokerage firm. Next the money is "layered" by wiring it to accounts owned by shell companies, with transactions taking place over a period of time. 

Because these companies are based in countries with weak or nonexistent disclosure rules, the original money becomes impossible to trace. 

At the integration stage (  JNU Commie Kanhaiya Kumar will say INTEGRASSANN ) , the money reenters the mainstream economy through legitimate-looking transactions such as an investment in a local business or the purchase of goods at highly inflated prices from a company owned by the launderer.

A LOT OF FDI IN INDIA IS KICKBACKS RECEIVED BY CORRUPT INDIAN POLITICIANS –LOOPED BACK USING A WHITE SKINNED MAN

A US race and his partners seemed to be making far more money than seemed plausible. The feds couldn't pinpoint the problem until they arrested a major drug dealer who was placing large bets at the track.

The managing partner, fearful of a full-fledged investigation, avoided prosecution by explaining how the racetrack earned its seemingly outsize profits. Using the track's pari-mutuel betting operations, the owners had been able to provide patrons with large kickbacks. 

In pari-mutuel operations, bettors bet against each other instead of the track, and a portion of all bets is given to the house.

Parimutuel betting ( French: Pari Mutuel or mutual betting) is a betting system in which all bets of a particular type are placed together in a pool; taxes and the "house-take" or "vigorish" are removed, and payoff odds are calculated by sharing the pool among all winning bets. 

In some countries it is known as the Tote after the totalisator, which calculates and displays bets already made. 

The parimutuel system is used in gambling on horse racing, greyhound racing, jai alai, and all sporting events of relatively short duration in which participants finish in a ranked order. A modified parimutuel system is also used in some lottery games.  

Two months ago, the US Internal Revenue Service  announced new rules for withholding and reporting of pari-mutuel winnings as well as games such as slots, keno and bingo.

The changes promote greater compliance and more accurate reporting and withholding by taxpayers, but also reduce burdensome and needless paperwork system-wide.

Welfare recipients in USA have been  using their electronic benefit transfer (EBT) cards to purchase, among other things, alcohol and tobacco, and also used the funds to gamble.

Millions of  US welfare funds are spent at casinos.

In Texas has no regulations on how one’s welfare money is spent—you can spend it in a whorehouse 

.

Regardless, the US federal government seized the track in a civil forfeiture proceeding because the drug dealer had used it to launder his money.

Many money laundering stories seem to involve innocuous transactions such as buying racehorses, yachts or condominiums, all of which seem far removed from the corporate world. 

But companies need to realize that there are lots of ways that money launderers can penetrate even buttoned-up corporate environments, whether through the computer parts supplier, the real estate company from which it leases offices or the golf club where executives mingle.

One scheme that became the focus of a congressional investigation was known as the "Toys For Drugs Black Market Peso Exchange Scheme." The owners of Los Angeles-based toy wholesaler Woody Toys Inc. received millions in cash payments from Colombian drug traffickers through small deposits into its bank accounts.

The company used these deposits to buy toys from manufacturers in China, and the toys were shipped to Colombia. The proceeds from toy sales in Colombia were then used to pay back the drug traffickers.

Moreover, the US federal government doesn't need a high level of proof to charge a company with conspiracy and seize goods. All that's required is probable cause.

The company then has a short time to challenge the seizure. This kind of seizure is one reason that big pharma companies have adopted their own anti-money laundering protocols. 

Take the case of Arthur Budovsky, who was recently sentenced to 20 years in prison after pleading guilty to running a money laundering operation. 

His virtual currency company Liberty Reserve allowed users to register and transfer money by supplying only a name, email address and birth date. It operated much like bitcoin trading sites. 

According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Liberty acted as a "shadow banking system" for criminals, and the government seized its assets.

Operation Universal Money Fast in 2009 targeted a large, sophisticated fraud against Medicare and private insurance companies in the southeastern United States. 

The perpetrators of the fraud opened shell companies and phantom clinics across Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina. The clinics were empty store fronts; some were nothing more than a post office box. 

No patients were ever seen or treated and no doctors worked there, yet tens of millions of dollars in bogus claims related primarily to HIV infusion therapy were submitted to Medicare and private insurers. The criminals used stolen identities and paid for the complicity of some physicians to lend an air of legitimacy to the fraud.

To conceal their identities, the criminals registered the bogus businesses in the names of nominee owners. They also opened their own check-cashing store, Universal Money Fast, to launder more than $50 million in benefits paid by Medicare and private insurers.

In 2007, in Washington, D.C., a woman was charged under the organized crime statute  for operating a multimillion dollar prostitution ring across several states and laundering the proceeds through money orders, banks, real estate, and securities investments. 

The defendant, who lived in California, allegedly owned and managed Pamela Martin and Associates, which advertised as an escort service. 

The business managed the appointments for the employees who allegedly were instructed to keep a portion of the cash they earned and use the rest to buy money orders which were mailed to the defendant. 

According to the indictment, the defendant deposited the money orders in bank accounts in California and subsequently drew on the accounts to buy real estate and fund several brokerage accounts.

Although used legitimately for relatively small value transactions, money orders present a money laundering risk due to the opportunity to conduct anonymous transactions below the federal recordkeeping threshold. The risk is magnified by structuring.  

Frequently reported suspicious activity is minimal gaming, characterized by a customer buying chips or depositing funds into an account with the casino and then cashing out after little or no play. This may be indicative of money laundering, especially at casinos that allow a customer to exchange cash for a casino check or wire transfer. 

In 2011, in Maryland USA a man and woman who managed a multimillion dollar heroin ring in the Baltimore area were indicted on drug trafficking and money laundering charges. The heroin was purchased from suppliers in New York and brought to the Baltimore area for retail sale. The couple allegedly used drug cash for gambling in Las Vegas casinos and bought lottery tickets from winners. 

The couple allegedly conspired with a used car dealer, paying the dealer with drug cash in exchange for checks written on the dealership’s bank account. The couple also created two limited liability companies that held title to eight properties.

The money laundering methods identified in the NMLRA exploit one or more of the following vulnerabilities:--

• Use of cash and monetary instruments in amounts under regulatory recordkeeping and reportingthresholds

• Opening bank and brokerage accounts in the names of businesses and nominees to disguise the

identity of the individuals who control the accounts

• Deficient compliance with AML regulations

• Merchants and financial institutions wittingly facilitating illicit activity

FinCEN, the U.S. financial intelligence unit (FIU), has an international training program that focuses on providing training and technical assistance to a broad spectrum of foreign government officials, financial regulators, law enforcement personnel, and bankers. 

This training covers a wide variety of topics, including money laundering typologies, the creation and operation of FIUs, assistance in the establishment of comprehensive anti-money laundering regimes, computer systems architecture and operations, and assessments of country-specific money laundering regimes and regulations. 

FinCEN also works closely with the Egmont Group of FIUs to provide training and technical assistance to various jurisdictions for establishing and operating their own FIUs.

Smart cards, generally issued by non-banking financial service providers such as large brokerage houses, operate completely outside of any U.S. government regulations. This lack of regulatory oversight creates vulnerability as no record is created or maintained on the transfer of data. 

In theory, financial information and monetary funds can be accessed, manipulated, and transferred to or from an account, or from card to card, with no "footprint" being made. Systems that support this industry can move billions of dollars a day through computer networks that often are not regulated or controlled by any government entity.

Skimming is the unauthorized capture and replication of data from a person's credit card through the use of a small, hand-held device, which can later be used to download the information for illicit purposes. 

The ease and speed with which information can be gathered and used for illegal purposes in a skimming operation represents a threat to financial institutions around the world. 

The Secret Service has trained foreign law enforcement officials about the type of equipment, manner of operation, and distribution methods for the information taken from unsuspecting credit card holders. Industry sources have estimated that skimming outside of the United States alone affects approximately one hundred seventy five different businesses per week. 

This large number of compromised points of sale has the potential to cause many millions of dollars in fraud losses.

A mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) is an agreement between two or more countries for the purpose of gathering and exchanging information in an effort to enforce public or criminal laws.

Modern states have developed mechanisms for requesting and obtaining evidence for criminal investigations and prosecutions. 

When evidence or other forms of legal assistance, such as witness statements or the service of documents, are needed from a foreign sovereign, states may attempt to cooperate informally through their respective police agencies or, alternatively, resort to what is typically referred to as requests for “mutual legal assistance."

 The practice of mutual legal assistance developed from the comity-based system of letters rogatory, though it is now far more common for states to make mutual legal assistance requests directly to the designated central authority within each state. 

In contemporary practice, such requests may still be made on the basis of reciprocity but may also be made pursuant to bilateral and multilateral treaties that obligate countries to provide assistance.

This assistance may take the form of examining and identifying people, places and things, custodial transfers, and providing assistance with the immobilization of the instruments of criminal activity.

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) allow generally for the exchange of evidence and information in criminal and ancillary matters. In money laundering cases, they can be extremely useful as a means of obtaining banking and other financial records from  treaty partners. 

The current ability of money launderers to penetrate virtually any financial system makes every jurisdiction a potential money laundering center. There is no precise measure of vulnerability for any financial system; but a checklist of what drug money managers reportedly look for provides a basic guide. The checklist includes:

Failure to criminalize money laundering for all serious crimes or limiting the offense to narrow predicates.

Rigid bank secrecy rules that obstruct law enforcement investigations or that prohibit or inhibit large value and/or suspicious or unusual transaction reporting by both banks and non-bank financial institutions.

Lack of or inadequate "know your client" requirements to open accounts or conduct financial transactions, including the permitted use of anonymous, nominee, numbered or trustee accounts.

No requirement to disclose the beneficial owner of an account or the true beneficiary of a transaction.

Lack of effective monitoring of cross-border currency movements.

No reporting requirements for large cash transactions.

No requirement to maintain financial records over a specific period of time.

No mandatory requirement to report suspicious transactions or a pattern of inconsistent reporting under a voluntary system; lack of uniform guidelines for identifying suspicious transactions.

Use of bearer monetary instruments.

Well-established non-bank financial systems, especially where regulation, supervision, and monitoring are absent or lax.

Patterns of evasion of exchange controls by legitimate businesses.

Ease of incorporation, especially where ownership can be held through nominees or bearer shares, or where off-the-shelf corporations can be acquired.

No central reporting unit for receiving, analyzing and disseminating to the competent authorities information on large value, suspicious or unusual financial transactions that might identify possible money laundering activity.

Lack of or weak bank regulatory controls, or failure to adopt or adhere to the Basle Principles for International Banking Supervision, especially in jurisdictions where the monetary or bank supervisory authority is understaffed, underskilled or uncommitted.

Well-established offshore financial centers or tax-haven banking systems, especially jurisdictions where such banks and accounts can be readily established with minimal background investigations.

Extensive foreign banking operations, especially where there is significant wire transfer activity or multiple branches of foreign banks, or limited audit authority over foreign-owned banks or institutions.

Limited asset seizure or confiscation authority.

Limited narcotics, money laundering and financial crime enforcement and lack of trained investigators or regulators.

Jurisdictions with free trade zones where there is little government presence or other supervisory authority.

Patterns of official corruption or a laissez-faire attitude toward the business and banking communities.

Jurisdictions where the U.S. dollar is readily accepted, especially jurisdictions where banks and other financial institutions allow dollar deposits.

Well-established access to international bullion trading centers in New York, Istanbul, Zurich, Dubai and Mumbai.

Jurisdictions where there is significant trade in or export of gems, particularly diamonds.

Jurisdictions with large parallel or black market economies.

Limited or no ability to share financial information with foreign law enforcement authorities.

Loopholes in financial regulations

(i) No or inadequate regulations and supervision of financial institutions

1. Are there effective regulations and supervision, if any, for all financial institutions in a given country or territory, onshore or offshore, on an equivalent basis with respect to international standards applicable to money laundering?

(ii) Inadequate licensing and rules for the creation of financial institutions, including assessing the backgrounds of their managers and beneficial owner

2. Is it possible for individuals or legal entities to operate a financial institution without authorization or registration or with very rudimentary requirements for authorization or registration?

3. Are there measures to guard against holding of management functions and control or acquisition of a significant investment in financial institutions by criminals or their confederates?

(iii) Inadequate customer identification requirements for financial institutions

4. Do anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names exist?

5. Are there effective laws, regulations, agreements between supervisory authorities and financial institutions or self-regulatory agreements among financial institutions on identification by the financial institution of the client and beneficial owner of an account?

Is it mandatory to verify the identity of the client?

Is it a requirement to identify the beneficial owners where there are doubts as to whether the client is acting on his own behalf?

Is there an obligation to renew identification of the client or the beneficial owner when doubts appear as to their identity in the course of business relationships?

Are financial institutions required to develop ongoing anti-money laundering training programs?

6. Is there a legal or regulatory obligation for financial institutions or agreements between supervisory authorities and financial institutions or self-agreements among financial institutions to record and keep, for a reasonable and sufficient time (five years), documents connected with the identity of their clients, as well as records on national and international transactions?

7. Are there legal or practical obstacles to access by administrative and judicial authorities to information with respect to the identity of the holders or beneficial owners and information connected with the transactions recorded?

(iv) Excessive secrecy provisions regarding financial institutions

8. Can secrecy provisions be invoked against, but not lifted by competent administrative authorities in the context of inquiries concerning money laundering?

9. Can secrecy provisions be invoked against, but not lifted by judicial authorities in criminal investigations related to money laundering?

(v) Lack of efficient suspicious transactions reporting system

10. Is there an efficient mandatory system for reporting suspicious or unusual transactions to a competent authority, provided that such a system aims to detect and prosecute money laundering?

11. Are there monitoring and criminal or administrative sanctions in respect to the obligation to report suspicious or unusual transactions?

B. Obstacles raised by other regulatory requirements

(i) Inadequate commercial law requirements for registration of business and legal entities

12. Are there adequate means for identifying, recording and making available relevant information related to legal and business entities (name, legal form, address, identity of directors, provisions regulating the power to bind the entity)?

(ii) Lack of identification of the beneficial owner(s) of legal and business entities

13. Are there obstacles to identification by financial institutions of the beneficial owner(s) and directors/officers of a company or beneficiaries of legal or business entities?

14. Are there regulatory or other systems which allow financial institutions to carry out financial business where the beneficial owner(s) of transactions is unknown, or is represented by an intermediary who refuses to divulge that information, without informing the competent authorities?

C. Obstacles to international co-operation

(i) Obstacles to international co-operation by administrative authorities

15. Do laws or regulations prohibit international exchange of information between administrative anti-money laundering authorities or do not grant clear gateways or subjecting exchange of information to unduly restrictive conditions?

16. Are relevant administrative authorities prohibited from conducting investigations or inquiries on behalf of or for account of their foreign counterparts?

17. Has obvious unwillingness to respond constructively to requests (e.g. failure to take the appropriate measures in due course, long delays in responding) been observed?

18. Are there restrictive practices in international co-operation against money laundering between supervisory authorities or between FIUs for the analysis and investigation of suspicious transactions, especially on the grounds that such transactions may relate to tax matters? (ii) Obstacles to international co-operation by judicial authorities

19. Is the laundering of the proceeds from serious crimes being criminalized?

20. Do laws or regulations prohibit international exchange of information between judicial authorities (notably specific reservations to the anti-money laundering provisions of international agreements) or place highly restrictive conditions on the exchange of information?

21. Has obvious unwillingness to respond constructively to mutual legal assistance requests (e.g. failure to take the appropriate measures in due course, long delays in responding) been observed?

22. Does the jurisdiction refuse to provide judicial co-operation in cases involving offences recognized as such by the requested jurisdiction especially on the grounds that tax matters are involved?

D. Inadequate resources for preventing and detecting money laundering activities

(i) Lack of resources in public and private sectors

23. Are the administrative and judicial authorities provided with the necessary financial, human or technical resources to exercise their functions or to conduct their investigations?

24. Is there inadequate or corrupt professional staff in governmental, judicial or supervisory authorities or among those responsible for anti-money laundering compliance in the financial services industry?

(ii) Absence of a financial intelligence unit or of an equivalent mechanism

25. Is there a centralized unit (i.e., a financial intelligence unit) or of an equivalent mechanism for the collection, analysis and dissemination of suspicious transactions information to competent authorities?

Offshore banking licenses. A multinational corporation sets up an offshore bank to handle its foreign exchange operations or to facilitate financing of an international joint venture. 

An onshore bank establishes a wholly owned subsidiary in an OFC to provide offshore fund administration services (e.g., fully integrated global custody, fund accounting, fund administration, and transfer agent services). The owner of a regulated onshore bank establishes a sister "parallel" bank in an OFC.

 The attractions of the OFC may include no capital tax, no withholding tax on dividends or interest, no tax on transfers, no corporation tax, no capital gains tax, no exchange controls, light regulation and supervision, less stringent reporting requirements, and less stringent trading restrictions.

Offshore corporations or international business corporations (IBCs). IBCs are limited liability vehicles registered in an OFC. They may be used to own and operate businesses, issue shares, bonds, or raise capital in other ways.

 They can be used to create complex financial structures. IBCs may be set up with one director only. In some cases, residents of the OFC host country may act as nominee directors to conceal the identity of the true company directors. In some OFCs, bearer share certificates may be used. 

In other OFCs, registered share certificates are used, but no public registry of shareholders is maintained. In many OFCs, the costs of setting up IBCs are minimal and they are generally exempt from all taxes. IBCs are a popular vehicle for managing investment funds.

A commercial corporation establishes a captive insurance company in an OFC to manage risk and minimize taxes. An onshore insurance company establishes a subsidiary in an OFC to reinsure certain risks underwritten by the parent and reduce overall reserve and capital requirements. 

An onshore reinsurance company incorporates a subsidiary in an OFC to reinsure catastrophic risks. The attractions of an OFC in these circumstances include favorable income/withholding/capital tax regime and low or weakly enforced actuarial reserve requirements and capital standards. 

Tax planning. Wealthy individuals make use of favorable tax environments in, and tax treaties with, OFCs, often involving offshore companies, trusts, and foundations. There is also a range of schemes that, while legally defensible, rely on complexity and ambiguity, often involving types of trusts not available in the client's country of residence.

 Multinational companies route activities through low tax OFCs to minimize their total tax bill through transfer pricing, i.e., goods may be made onshore but invoices are issues offshore by an IBC owned by the multinational, moving onshore profits to low tax regimes.

There are also individuals and enterprises who rely on banking secrecy to avoid declaring assets and income to the relevant tax authorities. Those moving money gained from illegal transaction also seek maximum secrecy from tax and criminal investigation.

Wealthy individuals and enterprises in countries with weak economies and fragile banking systems may want to keep assets overseas to protect them against the collapse of their domestic currencies and domestic banks, and outside the reach of existing or potential exchange controls. 

If these individuals also seek confidentiality, then an account in an OFC is often the vehicle of choice. In some cases, fear of wholesale seizures of illegitimately acquired assets is also a motive for going offshore. In this case, confidentiality is very important. 

Also, many individuals facing unlimited liability in their home jurisdictions seek to restructure ownership of their assets through offshore trusts to protect those assets from onshore lawsuits. 

Some offshore jurisdictions have legislation in place that protects those who transfer property to a personal trust from forced inheritance provisions in the home countries. 

International Financial Centers (IFCs)—such as London, New York, and Tokyo—are large international full-service centers with advanced settlement and payments systems, supporting large domestic economies, with deep and liquid markets where both the sources and uses of funds are diverse, and where legal and regulatory frameworks are adequate to safeguard the integrity of principal-agent relationships and supervisory functions. 

IFCs generally borrow short-term from non-residents and lend long-term to non-residents. In terms of assets, London is the largest and most established such center, followed by New York, the difference being that the proportion of international to domestic business is much greater in the former.

OFCs can be used for legitimate reasons, taking advantage of:-- 

(1) lower explicit taxation and consequentially increased after tax profit; 

(2) simpler prudential regulatory frameworks that reduce implicit taxation; 

(3) minimum formalities for incorporation; 

(4) the existence of adequate legal frameworks that safeguard the integrity of principal-agent relations; 

(5) the proximity to major economies, or to countries attracting capital inflows; 

(6) the reputation of specific OFCs, and the specialist services provided; 

(7) freedom from exchange controls; and 

(8) a means for safeguarding assets from the impact of litigation etc. 

SORRY , IN INDIA WE DON’T RECOGNIZE ALL THIS BULLSHIT

We in India know they are used for dubious purposes, such as tax evasion and money-laundering, by taking advantage of a higher potential for less transparent operating environments, including a higher level of anonymity, to escape the notice of the law enforcement agencies in the "home" country of the beneficial owner of the funds.

Banking activity in OFCs is now predominantly carried out by branches and affiliates of banks incorporated elsewhere, mainly in major countries, but also in larger emerging market economies. Since the failure of BCCI  it has become difficult for a bank incorporated in a jurisdiction with limited domestic markets to carry on business in other countries.

Offshore banks engage in a wide variety of transactions: foreign currency loans (including syndicated loans) and the taking of deposits, the issue of securities, over-the counter (OTC) trading in derivatives for risk-management and speculative purposes, and the management of customers' financial assets. 

Money laundering is a process by which the illicit source of assets obtained or generated by criminal activity is concealed to obscure the link between the funds and the original criminal activity. 

Terrorist financing involves the raising and processing of assets to supply terrorists with resources to pursue their activities. 

While these two phenomena differ in many ways, they often exploit the same vulnerabilities in financial systems that allow for an inappropriate level of anonymity and non-transparency in the execution of financial transactions.

After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the IMF intensified its AML activities and extended them to include combating the financing of terrorism (CFT).

 The IMF is especially concerned about the possible consequences money laundering, terrorist financing, and related crimes have on the integrity and stability of the financial sector and the broader economy. These activities can undermine the integrity and stability of financial institutions and systems, discourage foreign investment, and distort international capital flows. 

They may have negative consequences for a country’s financial stability and macroeconomic performance, resulting in welfare losses, draining resources from more productive economic activities, and even have destabilizing spillover effects on the economies of other countries.. 

Money launderers and terrorist financiers exploit both the complexity inherent in the global financial system as well as differences between national AML/CFT laws and systems, and they are especially attracted to jurisdictions with weak or ineffective controls where they can more easily move their funds without detection. 

Moreover, problems in one country can quickly spread to other countries in the region or in other parts of the world.

http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2009/0035/latest/DLM2140720.html?src=qs

https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf

http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1996/0009/latest/DLM373804.html?src=qs

Strong AML/CFT regimes enhance financial sector integrity and stability, which in turn facilitate countries’ integration into the global financial system. They also strengthen governance and fiscal administration. 

The integrity of national financial systems is essential to financial sector and macroeconomic stability both at the national and international levels.

Shell companies exist in several dozen "offshore" jurisdictions that permit them to hide the names of their true owners. They have no operational role other than to carry out criminal activities, hide money from law enforcers, evade court judgments and cheat tax authorities. 

They are designed to conceal the origin and destination of goods in international trade and to evade taxes by hiding profits and assets. They are essential to illicit drug, arms and people traffickers.

Also called international business corporations or private investment companies, they are often dormant companies are purchased "off the shelf ' from banks, lawyers, accountants or secretarial firms so they can have a "history" -- "ABC Corp., founded in 1970."

 They must operate outside the jurisdictions where they are incorporated. There are MILLIONS of anonymous corporations that control a growing share of international capital. Little is known about their holdings because they are not required to file financial reports. 

Incorporated as legal entities with limited liability, they commonly use bearer shares and nominee shareholders and directors provided by the incorporating firm. Bearer share companies in secrecy havens are owned by "the bearer of shares"--no name supplied even to the registration office. 

The ownership of the company passes with the certificate. There are as many as 25 bearer share countries, including Grand Cayman, Curacao, Panama, Gibralter, Belize, Pacific Naru, and Vanuatu.

Secret trusts do not identify either the grantors or beneficiaries, leaving real control in the hands of a "trust protector" who is not identified in the trust instrument. The courts of the trust jurisdiction are barred by law from hearing claims against the assets of the trust. 

Many also have a "flee clause" which requires the trustee to transfer the assets to another jurisdiction in case of law enforcement inquiries or service of writs. 

The G-7 ministers asked the OECD to look at ways to identify the beneficial ownership of corporations, trusts, limited partnerships and other corporate vehicles that are neither owned publicly nor in the financial markets where they would be scrutinized by financial regulators.

The steering group on corporate governance looked at three elements: how secret corporate vehicles are misused for illicit purposes, including money laundering, tax evasion, tax fraud, corporate fraud, and other corporate governance abuses, the mechanisms countries use to identify beneficial owners, and how information on beneficial ownership can be shared among authorities domestically and internationally when there are suspicious activities.

The report says that beneficial ownership of companies should be either maintained or readily obtainable by authorities; the systems and mechanisms used to obtain beneficial ownership should have high integrity and adequate supervision; and there should be mechanisms to share information about beneficial ownership among law enforcement authorities.

Based on those standards, countries will have three options. 

The first is to obtain beneficial ownership information with up-front disclosure.. A country cannot rely on investigative methods if it can't show that it has an investigative mechanism that is effective, efficient and strong enough to obtain beneficial ownership information whenever needed. 

Primary reliance on an up front disclosure system would be appropriate in jurisdictions with 1) a generally weak investigative system, 2) high proportion of non-resident ownership of corporate vehicles (particularly those owned by individuals or by shell corporations), 3) high proportion of shell companies or asset holding companies, and 4) anonymity-enhancing instruments. That means all offshore centers.

The second is to rely on a system that makes intermediaries, including lawyers and company formation agents, responsible for maintaining beneficial owners.   

That would be appropriate "in jurisdictions with 1) adequate investigative mechanisms to effectively monitor compliance by corporate service providers with their obligation to obtain beneficial ownership and control information and 2) a sufficient number of corporate service providers with suitable experience and adequate resources to undertake the collection and maintenance of beneficial ownership and control information.

And the third is to rely on investigative methods if a country has a proven system that works. 

The third option would be appropriate "in jurisdictions where 1) the authorities possess strong compulsory powers and capacity to obtain beneficial ownership and control information, 2) there is a reliable history of enforcement, 3) the judicial system functions effectively and efficiently, and 4) beneficial ownership and control information is likely to be available within the jurisdiction."

The Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO)  is a fraud investigating agency in India.

WE ASK MODI TO HAVE BETTER BRAINS IN THIS AGENCY

It is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Government of India. The SFIO is involved in major fraud probes and is the co-ordinating agency with the Income Tax and CBI.

It is a multi-disciplinary organization having experts from financial sector, capital market, accountancy, forensic audit, taxation, law, information technology, company law, customs and investigation. These experts have been taken from various organizations like banks, Securities and Exchange Board of India, Comptroller and Auditor General and concerned organizations and departments of the Government.

The Government approved setting up of this organization on 9 January 2003 on the basis of the recommendations made by the Naresh Chandra Committee which was set up by the Government on 21 August 2002 on corporate governance.

  

The agency has 4 regional offices in Hyderabad, Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai.

DOES THE REGIONAL OFFICE AT KOLKATA EVEN KNOW WHAT A SHELL COMPANY IS ALL ABOUT AND HOW IT WORKS ?

What have they been doing since 2003 ?  

There are more than 31,000 shell companies in Kolkata alone !

WE WANT HEADS TO ROLL –PM MODI !  

STOP THEIR PENSIONS !

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/cas-advocates-helped-in-laundering-illicit-cash-govt-4573322/

Money launderers set up a British Virgin Islands corporation, open a bank account in Curacao, airfreight the money to Aruba, have that wire transferred. In days, it's been through three jurisdictions, and there are no records. 

You can convert profits to losses, put money in phony loans, buy businesses without people knowing who you are, and evade all laws regulating money. If authorities looking into a loan to the company want to find out who owns it, lawyers say, “That's protected by secrecy law.'

Most Latin American companies in international trade use shell accounts.  If you have a Colombian company that imports Mercedes trucks from Germany, the company ordering the trucks will be registered in the British Virgin Islands or Curacao. 

The order will be made by the Dick, Prick and Mary Company; no Colombian firm will handle invoices.  Colombian tax authorities won't know how much business they're doing."

Money laundering is the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and integrating it into the legitimate financial system. Before proceeds of crime are laundered, it is problematic for criminals to use the illicit money because they cannot explain where it came from and it is easier to trace it back to the crime. 

After being laundered, it becomes difficult to distinguish money from legitimate financial resources, and the funds can be used by criminals without detection.

In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile Western bank scandals over money laundering. Most notably, HSBC admitted to violating the Bank Secrecy Act by failing to monitor over $200 trillion in wire transactions between its Mexico and U.S. subsidiaries, among other crimes. $881 million in drug money from the Sinaloa and Norte de Valle drug cartels were found to have been moved through HSBC-Mexico’s accounts to HSBC-USA via the unmonitored wire transactions. 

In 2012, HCBC  paid a record-breaking $1.9bn to US authorities for a range of failings, including laundering Mexican drug money and doing business with countries covered by sanctions, such as Iran.

HSBC, Rothschild , Coutts,  UBS, Société Générale and Credit Suisse were among those that helped Mossack Fonseca hatch thousands of shell companies for clients, according to  the Panamanian firm’s leaked files.

The Rothschild’s British banking group HSBC and its subsidiaries alone accounts for more than 2,300 of the 15,600 shell companies created by the Panama-based firm over nearly four decades

More than 500 banks in all requested that Mossack Fonseca create shell companies for their clients from 1977 through the end of 2015.. Panama-based Mossack Fonseca has branches in Hong Kong, Miami, Zurich and more than 35 other places around the globe

http://www.livemint.com/Industry/Ysfcu07CRsi2rlP72n5mmN/HSBC-discloses-tax-evasion-probes-in-India-other-countries.html

Money launderers set up a British Virgin Islands corporation, open a bank account in Curacao, airfreight the money to Aruba, have that wire transferred. In days, it's been through three jurisdictions, and there are no records. 

You can convert profits to losses, put money in phony loans, buy businesses without people knowing who you are, and evade all laws regulating money. If authorities looking into a loan to the company want to find out who owns it, lawyers say, “That's protected by secrecy law.'

Most Latin American companies in international trade use shell accounts.  If you have a Colombian company that imports Mercedes trucks from Germany, the company ordering the trucks will be registered in the British Virgin Islands or Curacao.

 The order will be made by the Dick, Prick and Mary Company; no Colombian firm will handle invoices.  Colombian tax authorities won't know how much business they're doing."

Money laundering is the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and integrating it into the legitimate financial system. Before proceeds of crime are laundered, it is problematic for criminals to use the illicit money because they cannot explain where it came from and it is easier to trace it back to the crime. 

After being laundered, it becomes difficult to distinguish money from legitimate financial resources, and the funds can be used by criminals without detection.

In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile Western bank scandals over money laundering. Most notably, HSBC admitted to violating the Bank Secrecy Act by failing to monitor over $200 trillion in wire transactions between its Mexico and U.S. subsidiaries, among other crimes. 

$881 million in drug money from the Sinaloa and Norte de Valle drug cartels were found to have been moved through HSBC-Mexico’s accounts to HSBC-USA via the unmonitored wire transactions. 

In 2012, HCBC  paid a record-breaking $1.9billion to US authorities for a range of failings, including laundering Mexican drug money and doing business with countries covered by sanctions, such as Iran.

HSBC, Rothschild , Coutts,  UBS, Société Générale and Credit Suisse were among those that helped Mossack Fonseca hatch thousands of shell companies for clients, according to  the Panamanian firm’s leaked files.

The Rothschild’s British banking group HSBC and its subsidiaries alone accounts for more than 2,300 of the 15,600 shell companies created by the Panama-based firm over nearly four decades

More than 500 banks in all requested that Mossack Fonseca create shell companies for their clients from 1977 through the end of 2015.. Panama-based Mossack Fonseca has branches in Hong Kong, Miami, Zurich and more than 35 other places around the globe

http://www.livemint.com/Industry/Ysfcu07CRsi2rlP72n5mmN/HSBC-discloses-tax-evasion-probes-in-India-other-countries.html

Capt. Ajit VadakayilDecember 30, 2016 at 3:08 PM

THE ULTRA RICH BHADRALOK MARWARIS IN CALCUTTA ARE ALL EX-OPIUM DRUG RUNNERS OF JEW ROTHSCHILD..

http://ajitvadakayil.blogspot.in/2010/11/drug-runners-of-india-capt-ajit.html

THE PASHTUN PATHAN KHANS OF CALCUTTA ARE MOSTLY CRYPTO JEWS

THE ARMENIAN DRUG RUNNERS HAVE LEFT

BAGHDADI JEWS EMPLOYED BY ROTHSCHILDs RELATIVE JEW SASSOON HAVE LEFT FOR ISRAEL.

CHINESE OPIUM MAFIA DESCENDANTS REMAINS -- A LOT OF SHOE SHOPS AND EATERIES BELONG TO THEM IN BENTICK STREET--LOT OF THEM ARE DENTISTS TODAY

THE OPIUM DENS OF YONG ATCHEW ( TAI PAK KUNG ) ARE LONG GONE

Tiretta Bazaar was the ADDA of the opium drug running chinese . Jew Rothschild and Sassoon exported Opium from India to China.

Opium is still available in Cheena Bazaar

The Chinese Opium drug runners would meet in secret at the Temple of Guan Yu, at the Chinese quarter near Dharamtholla.

When Jew Rothschild left India there were more than 60,000 chinese in Calcutta. They supplied Opium to the whorehouses of Sonagachi owned by Tagore's grandfather Dwaraknath --who was a Opium Drug runner himself. The granddad of Bhadraloks

http://ajitvadakayil.blogspot.in/2011/08/opium-drug-running-tagore-family-capt.html

http://ajitvadakayil.blogspot.in/2011/07/opium-raja-british-stooge-ram-mohan-roy.html

I HAVE TRACED THE ANCESTRY OF SUHEL SETH --ALL IN GOOD TIME

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/42/KolkataChinaTownOld.jpg

MAO TSE TUNG HAS JEWISH BLOOD. POOR BONG COMMIES--THEY KNOW SHIT

these stupid Indian commies do NOT know that Jew Rothschild created Communism - and Karl Marx was Rothschild's blood relative--that Lenin, Stalin, trotsky , Engels etc were all Jews.

http://ajitvadakayil.blogspot.in/2013/08/chinese-revolution-biggest-genocide-on.html

I have seen Chinese Jews in Israel.

Seven KOSHER surnames are Ai, Shi, Gao, Jin , Li , Zhang , and Zhao sinofications of the original seven Jewish clans’ family names: Ezra, Shimon, Cohen, Gilbert, Levy, Joshua, and Jonathan, respectively.

Two of these, Jin and Shi, are the equivalent of common Jewish names in the west: Gold and Stone.

THE CHINESE KAIFENG JEW PIRATES WERE OPIUM AGENTS OF JEW ROTHSCHILD. THEY WERE INVINCIBLE AS JEW ROTHSCHILD GAVE THEM LONG RANGE GUNS

CHING SHIH was a vicious female Jewess Chinese pirate who ate men's testicles

Ever heard of JEW Maurice strong ? He cooked up the GLOBAL WARMING WITH MAN MADE CO2 thingy. His mother was JEWESS Anna Louise Strong and father was Chine Premier Deng Xiaoping .

DONALD TRUMP KNOWS HOW CHINA ( maurice strong ) TOOK AWAY AMERICAN INDUSTRIES AND JOBS BY QUOTING POLLUTION.

Rothschild and Sassoon sold Opium only to the Jewish Chinese mafia--who were distributed and gave SILVER and tea in return

Both Opium wars were Jew Rothschild/ Jew Sassoon's wars

The 99 year British lease on Hong Kong which expired in July, 1997, allowing China to take over its land once again--was ROTHSCHILDs LEASE

David Sassoon's father JEW Saleh Sassoon, was Jew Rothschild's agent and treasurer to Ahmet Pasha, the governor of Baghdad.

Jew Rothschild made the British TEA drinkers

CONTINUED FROM 1-

1. 
   Capt. Ajit VadakayilDecember 30, 2016 at 3:09 PM

   CONTINUED TO 2-
   
   QUEEN VICTORIA WAS A DRUG RUNNER-- AN AGENT OF JEW ROTHSCHILD
   
   JEW Rothschild forced Indian farmers to stop farming food and turn to growing opium poppies. A lot of destitute families landed up as SLAVES abroad ( indentured labour )
   
   http://ajitvadakayil.blogspot.in/2010/04/indentured-coolie-slavery-reinvented.html
   
   THE RICHEST MEN IN USA ARE DESCENDANTS OF OPIUM DRUG RUNNERS --AGENTS OF JEW ROTHSCHILD
   
   http://ajitvadakayil.blogspot.in/2010/12/dirty-secrets-of-boston-tea-party-capt.html
   
   The entire DRUG trade and SLAVE trade was controlled by Rothschild and his Jewish agents . Today if you write this it becomes HATE SPEECH and DEFAMATION .
   
   The SLAVE British monarchy( to Jew Rothschild ) honored them with privilege ( earls/ dukes/ lords ) and knighthood .
   
   After the British established Hong Kong as a colony in the aftermath of the Opium Wars, local merchants felt the need for a bank to finance the growing opium trade with China, so they established (by special permit from the British) the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation - HSBC today - "The World's Bank".
   
   The huge textile mills in Bombay that paid true slave wages were all owned by Jew Rothschild and Sassoon with Indians as mere fronts
   
   ADI GODREJ THE ONER OF VIKROLI WHO RIDICULED "HINDU RATE OF GROWTH" KNOWS SHIT ABOUT HIS OWN ANCESTORS.
   
   Edward Albert. Sassoon married Aline Caroline de Rothschild in 1887
   
   JEW Roosevelt's fortune was inherited from his maternal grandfather JEW Warren Delano
   
   MAJJA HAI--KISSI KOH KUCH NAHIN PATHA
   
   capt ajit vadakayil
   ..

Sophisticated criminal operations often use trade-based money laundering, which can also involve trade misinvoicing, to move large quantities of illicit money between countries. By co-mingling the proceeds of crime with the proceeds of legitimate business, launderers are able to disguise the ultimate source of the illicit money. 

For example, in the Lebanese-Canadian Bank case, an international drug money laundering operation with ties to Hezbollah commingled the revenues from used car sales in Europe with cocaine sales in Africa.

The Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption -GOPAC is an independent international institution made up of democratically elected legislators from across the world, working together to combat corruption, strengthen good government, and uphold the rule of law. 

Based in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, GOPAC has fifty-two national chapters in five continental associations. GOPAC supports its members through original research, global anti‑corruption capacity building, and international peer support.

GOPAC seeks to achieve ethical and accountable governance throughout the world, through effective anti-corruption mechanisms and co-operation between parliamentarians, government leaders, and civil society. India is a member

GOPAC ('Global Order of Parliamentarians Against Corruption') recognises that regimes that lack systems of accountability and transparency typically allow for high levels of money laundering and corruption. Some of the poorest countries in the world are the most corrupt, as measured by Transparency International's Global Corruption Report.

There are areas of the world which specialise in non-disclosure, that is they have local laws which create the systems whereby the true ownership of assets can, quite legitimately remain concealed behind shell companies or in protected trusts fronted by lawyers who claim client confidentiality when questioned. 

Here rich people squirrel away assets from the taxman, vengeful ex – spouses or regulatory authorities behind legal walls which are almost impossible to penetrate even at government level. 

Money laundering is big business. Textbooks often describe the average money launderer either as criminals washing illegal proceeds of crime by setting up fake restaurants or smuggling the money in suitcases out to the Channel Islands, or sometimes as former officials of corrupt regimes buying luxury properties in London but, in fact, it is a global phenomenon on a far wider scale involving some very scary organisations indeed.

Global Financial Integrity (GFI) is a non-profit, research, advisory, and advocacy organization located in Washington, D.C.. GFI produces research on the scale, impact, and attributes of illicit financial flows—the proceeds of crime, corruption, and tax evasion—with a particular focus on developing and emerging economies. 

Staffed with a team of economists, lawyers, and policy analysts, the organization also advises developing country governments on policy solutions to curtail those flows, and promotes transparency measures in the international financial system as a means to global development and security.

Global Financial Integrity's areas of research apply primarily to stemming illicit financial flows, an illegal form of capital flight. GFI argues that illicit financial flows make poverty endemic; for every $1 poor nations receive in foreign aid, $10 in dirty money is taken abroad illicitly. 

The lack of controls on illicit outflows enable drug cartels, terrorist organizations and tax evaders to secretly move money around the world. The billions of dollars taken out of the third world embeds poverty, strips developing nations of critical resources, and contributes to failed states. 

Global Financial Integrity periodically releases updated reports estimating illicit financial flows, the proceeds of crime, corruption, and tax evasion, from all developing countries. In 2010, GFI released a report detailing offshore secrecy accounts held by non-residents. 

The report found that the total deposits by non-residents in offshore centers and secrecy jurisdictions was nearly $10 trillion; 

The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Cayman Islands were found to be the top destinations for offshore money.. GFI's 2010 India Report found that between 1948 and 2008, India lost $213 billion to illicit financial flows, and that the present value of India’s illicit financial flows is $462 billion.

 Most of the illicit financial flows were found to have come from High Net-Worth Individuals and private companies, as well as India's large underground economy. 

In addition, the Indian private sector was found to have shifted to offshore financial centers, up to 54.2% in 2009 from 36.4% in 1995. The report was widely cited in the international press following the start of the 2011 Indian anti-corruption movement as a way to measure the amount of black money held abroad.

Global Financial Integrity (GFI) has pushed for policies that bring transparency to the international financial system and stem illicit financial flows. 

The organizations has urged the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to implement new safeguards that will greatly improve transparency and cooperation in the global financial system. 

In early 2010, GFI launched the “G20 Transparency Campaign”, calling for greater transparency in the global financial system.[16]

GFI endorses stronger anti-money laundering laws and standards as well as stronger implementation of existing anti-money laundering laws and regulations. The organization specifically supports countries making all felonies predicate offenses for money laundering, it recommends compliance with all FATF standards, and it encourages regulators to strongly enforce all existing laws and regulations.

GFI was fiercely critical of the United States Government in the wake of recent anti-money laundering settlements with major banks such as HSBC, Standard Chartered, and Wachovia.

GFI has supported the Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Counterfeiting Act as well as the Holding Individuals Accountable and Deterring Money Laundering Act in the United States Congress as measures to help curtail money laundering.

GFI advocates against the abuse of anonymous companies as a tool for money laundering. The organization endorses the creation of public registers of beneficial ownership information, and it has supported efforts by the British Government and the European Parliament to do just that.

In the United States, GFI advocates in favor of the bipartisan Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, which would ban anonymous companies in the United States by creating beneficial ownership registries available to law enforcement. 

While the legislation does not require that the collected information be made available to the public, it leaves the possibility for the states to make the information public.

Proposed measures supported by GFI include "requiring companies to report on the profits made and taxes paid in every country in which they operate" (Country-by-Country reporting) and implementing the automatic exchange of tax information between jurisdictions. GFI also called upon the G20 to take action to encourage and implement the automatic exchange of tax information, which the G20 then endorsed in 2013

GFI has additionally supported the bipartisan Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, introduced by Senator Carl Levin. The bill would mandate Country-by-Country reporting for all companies registered with the SEC, a longtime goal of GFI

The Task Force has 5 main policy goals:-- 

Curtailment of mispricing in trade imports and exports;

Country-by-country accounting of sales, profits, and taxes paid by multinational corporations;

Confirmation of beneficial ownership in all banking and securities accounts;

Automatic cross-border exchange of tax information on personal and business accounts;

Harmonization of predicate offenses under anti-money laundering laws across all Financial Action Task Force cooperating countries.

Many of GFI’s policy recommendations, such as eliminating anonymous shell companies and tackling trade misinvoicing, will have the effect of making it more difficult to launder money, which means they make it more difficult for criminals to actually use their money without being caught.

 In addition to those, GFI has several other policy recommendations to address money laundering

Make all felonies predicate offenses for money laundering. In many countries, certain key crimes such as tax evasion cannot be the basis for a money laundering charge.

Countries should comply with all FATF standards. According to a 2013 OECD report, many FATF countries are poorly compliant on key standards designed to prevent money laundering.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) exists for the purpose of protecting the international financial system from misuse and to mobilise action to go after criminals and their assets. 

Objectives of the FATF in developing policy and promoting effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and new and emerging threats to the integrity of the international financial system.

The FATF members have adopted revised standards in February 2012.  Now these changes are well reflected in the new international standard.

Bankers who knowingly commit crimes and allow bank accounts to be used to shelter criminal money should be held personally accountable. To date, enforcement has generally focused on moderate-sized fines and promises by banks to improve compliance. No bank should be “too big to jail.”

India became a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2010. The membership of FATF comes nearly four years after the country became an observer in 2006.

FATF membership is very important for India in its quest to become a major player in international finance. It will help India to build the capacity to fight terrorism and trace terrorist money and help to successfully investigate and prosecute money laundering and terrorist financing offences. 

India will benefit in securing a more transparent and stable financial system by ensuring that financial institutions are not vulnerable to infiltration or abuse by organized crime groups.

There are many national level efforts to combat money laundering. Financial Intelligence Unit - India (FIU-IND) is the central, national agency responsible for receiving, processing, analyzing and disseminating information relating to suspect financial transactions to enforcement agencies and foreign FIUs. 

 http://www.dailypioneer.com/nation/swamy-exposes-pcs-hidden-assets-abroad.html

LIKE HOW DONALD TRUMP IS SYSTEMATICALLY REMOVING ALL OBAMA LOYALISTS


WE ASK MODI TO REMOVE ALL LOYALISTS OF THE ITALIAN WAITRESS FROM FINANCIAL WATCH DOG AGENCIES

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/EDs-Rs-2030-crore-notice-to-NDTV-for-Fema-breach/articleshow/49877029.cms

http://www.moneylife.in/article/delhi-hc-vacates-itat-stay-on-rs525-crore-penalty-on-ndtv/49995.html

The beginning of the 21st century is marked by the fall of a huge corporations  like  Enron which caused investors to lose faith in the stock market’s ability to deliver long-term growth . 

Due to this, much emphasis has been placed on the importance of financial information transparency and the restructuring of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) . 

Hence, corporations were pushed to establish better internal controls, increased management responsibility, and lower information asymmetry.  

This led to the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley act in the U.S. and the adaptation of IFRS by the E.U. in 2002.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is an act passed by U.S. Congress in 2002 to protect investors from the possibility of fraudulent accounting activities by corporations. 

The SOX Act mandated strict reforms to improve financial disclosures from corporations and prevent accounting fraud. 

The SOX Act was created in response to accounting malpractice in the early 2000s, when public scandals such as Enron Corporation shook investor confidence in financial statements and demanded an overhaul of regulatory standards. 

The act, drafted by U.S. Congressmen Paul Sarbanes and Michael Oxley, was aimed at improving corporate governance and accountability. Now, all public companies must comply with SOX in USA. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act not only affects the financial side of corporations, but also IT departments charged with storing a corporation's electronic records. 

The act is not a set of business practices and does not specify how a business should store records; rather, it defines which records should be stored and for how long. SOX states that all business records, including electronic records and electronic messages, must be saved for "not less than five years."

The consequences for noncompliance are fines, imprisonment or both. IT departments are increasingly tasked with creating and maintaining a corporate records archive in a cost-effective fashion that satisfies the requirements put forth by the legislation.

 Section 802 of Sarbanes-Oxley contains the three rules that affect the management of electronic records. The first rule deals with the destruction, alteration or falsification of records, and the resulting penalties. The second rule defines the retention period for records storage. 

Best practices indicate that corporations securely store all business records using the same guidelines set for public accountants. The third rule refers to the type of business records that need to be stored, including all business records and communications, including electronic communications

The intent of the SOX Act was to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures by:- 

closing loopholes in recent accounting practices

strengthening corporate governance rules

increasing accountability and disclosure requirements of corporations, especially corporate executives, and corporation's public accountants

increasing requirements for corporate transparency in reporting to shareholders and descriptions of financial transactions

strengthening whistle-blower protections and compliance monitoring

increasing penalties for corporate and executive malfeasance

authorizes the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight board to further monitor corporate behavior, especially in the area of accounting

In response to what was widely seen as collusion by Enron's accountants, The Arthur Andersen firm, in Enron's fraudulent behavior, SOX also changes the way corporate boards deal with their financial auditors. 

All companies, according to SOX, must provide a year-end, report about the internal controls they have in place and the effectiveness of those internal controls. The best plan of action for SOX compliance is to have the correct security controls in place to ensure that financial data is accurate and protected against loss. 

Developing best practices and relying on the appropriate tools helps businesses automate SOX compliance and reduce SOX management costs. 

The Securities and Exchange Board of India, or SEBI, which regulates India’s stock markets, took a major step in this direction a year ago. It asked Indian firms above a certain size to implement Clause 49, a regulation that strengthens the role of independent directors serving on corporate boards. 

In India, the SEBI monitors and regulates corporate governance of listed companies through Cl. 49 of the Listing Agreement. Cl. 49 of the Listing Agreement is influenced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 which has been enacted in US.. 

Clause 49 has prescribed certain duties for independent directors under which that they are supposed to review company efforts whether they are in compliance with all applicable laws and laying down a general code of conduct. 

Another crucial issue in relation to independent directors in India is that the majority of shareholders appoint independent directors. Noticeable, in India, most of the huge corporation’s shareholders are either individuals or family members. Further, the major fall back and serious threats to transparency and accountability comes because India companies are mostly family dominated. 

Therefore, the major stakeholders in most of these enterprises are family members who do not find it compelling to reveal sufficient information to the independent directors. Therefore for independent directors, to keep a check on the accountability and transparency becomes an arduous task especially because they attended very few meetings per year  that are to a large extent ceremonial in nature. 

Hence it is not possible for independent directors to fully comprehend the issues before the board, as most of the large business structures are often conglomerates having diverse interests and investments....

Independent Directors plays a significant role in good corporate governance. There is a huge scope of improvement in the role, power and selection of Independent Directors in Indian Companies.  The objectives of corporate governance cannot, perhaps, be as effectively met without the inclusion of independent directors in the larger scheme of things....

Under Clause 49 SEBI should also come as a reminder to directors that they are fiduciaries towards the shareholders, hence there should be continuous efforts being made to make them more accountable. The inclusion of independent directors is a check  on the management of companies as an oversight mechanism. .  

May be director of hajaaar companies , SUHEL SETH who loves British  invasions can explain better.

Capt. Ajit VadakayilMarch 18, 2017 at 10:14 PM

SUBJECT -- YOGI ADITYANATH AS CM OF UP

THERE IS NO POLITICAL ANAYLST IN INDIA WHO HAS THE CEREBRAL WHEREWITHAL

SO LISTEN UP

ALL CALLED MODI A DICTATOR

YOGI WAS MADE CM BY A COLLECTIVE DECISION WHICH DID NOT INVOLVE PM MODI

ALL SAY-- YOGI ADITYANATH IS A DIVISIIVE FIGURE.

YES HE WAS A DIVISIVE FIGURE WHEN HE WAS A MERE MP-- HE SPOKE AGAINST INJUSTICES TO THE MAJORITY HINDU COMMUNITY

NOW HE IS CM-- HE WILL CHANGE TO BE A STATESMAN

MY BEHAVIOR ON BOARD AS A TWO STRIPER IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF A FOUR STRIPER--YOU CHANGE WHEN YOU GET RESPONSIBILITY UNLESS YOU ARE NAVJOT SINGH SIDHU.. CAN YOU IMAGINE CAPT AMARINDER SINGH GUFFAWING ON KAPIL SHARMA TV SHOW LIKE A MAD DONKEY WHO HAS SEEN FRESH SHIT ?

WHEN I EVALUATE MY CHIEF OFFICER FOR PROMOTION--I JUST ASK MYSELF--IF THIS BOY GETS 4 STRIPES-- CAN HE THINK AND REACT LIKE A CAPTAIN ?

BASSS ! END OF STORY !!

THE MEDIA WHORES WILL LAY A MINE FIELD AHEAD OF YOGI ADITYANATH --SILENCE IS GOLDEN TILL YOU SETTLE DOWN ..

HE MUST ALLOW HIS DEPUTY CMs TO HANDLE THE MEDIA TILL HE SETTLES DOWN

MODI WAS CONSIDERED 1000 TIMES MORE DIVISIVE AND DISRUPTIVE THAN YOGI ADITYANATH --SO HOW IS HE NOW ?

AND WHO THE HELL ALLOWED A MERE BENAMI MEDIA BARON ( INDIA TODAY CONCLAVE ) TO MALIGN THE PM AS " CHIEF DISRUPTOR "?

HOW DARE HE ?

THERE WILL BE A HEAVY PRICE TO PAY- WAIT FOR IT TO HAPPEN , MR AROON PURIE...!!

TILL NOW NOBODY HAS FOUND OUT THAT BJP WON IN UP WITH HIGH CASTE HINDU AND FEMALE MUSLIM / LITERATE MUSLIM VOTE

DALITS VOTED FOR KUMAAARI MAYAWATI

YADAVs AND ILLITERATE MALE MUSLIMS ( RIGHT TO LEFT READING PARTY ) AND CHRISTIANS VOTED FOR SP/ CONGRESS

WOE BEGONE AN EDUCATED MUSLIM WHO ALLOWS TRIPLE TALAQ ON HIS MOTHER/ SISTER/ DAUGHTER-- WHAT IS HE WORTH AFTER THIS?

KORAN DOES NOT TALK ABOUT TRIPLE TALAQ. THE HADITHS HAVE BEEN POISON INJECTED BY CRYPTO JEWS

MOST OF THE TOP MUSLIM CLERICS IN INDIA AND CRYPTO JEWS WITH A ZEBIBA MARK/ ZEBIBA MARK IN WRONG PLACE

http://ajitvadakayil.blogspot.in/2011/07/cracked-heels-and-prayer-marks-capt.html

I WAS A VERY SUCCESSFUL CAPTAIN AT SEA --BECAUSE I HAD A PERSONAL POLICY FOR MYSELF

I ASKED MYSELF "WILL MY DECISION BE CULTURALLY FAIR "

MY RISK ASSESSMENT FORM HAD A FINAL TRUTH TABLE "CERTAINTY SWITCH "-- YES/ NO-- . GO/ NO GO-- RED FLAG/ GREEN FLAG/

http://ajitvadakayil.blogspot.in/2010/04/dynamic-risk-assessment-on-chemical.html


http://ajitvadakayil.blogspot.in/2014/12/remove-word-secular-from-indian.html

SEND THIS COMMENT TO THE WEBSITES OF PM MODI, HOME MINISTER, LAW MINISTER AND CM YOGI ADITYANATH

capt ajit vadakayil
..

Below: The white man was most sarcastic when they heard that Lord Rama built a bridge from India to Lanka using floating pumice stones ( IN CERTAIN AREAS ONLY ) . 

They can suck on this video- and suck it good !

http://smartinvestor.business-standard.com/market/story-444595-storydet-I_T_department_identifies_30_000_shell_companies_in_Kolkata.htm#.WMzJu9KGPIU

THIS POST IS NOW CONTINUED TO PART 20, BELOW--

http://ajitvadakayil.blogspot.in/2017/03/shell-companies-for-money-laundering_19.html

CAPT AJIT VADAKAYIL
..